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ROBERT G. HAWKINSNew York University
CAPEAL markets in the continental European countries have recently
been the subject of much interest and study. Part of this interest con-
cerns the role of capital-market integration and international capital
mobility in the process of integration of the EEC countries. Continued
progress toward EEC integration was uncertain during 1968—69 as
basic problems involving exchange-rate adjustments, the common
agricultural policy, and a membership broadened to include the United
Kingdom forced a reevaluation of earlier expectations. Likewise, there
occurred a partial, and perhaps temporary, retrenchment on earlier
liberalizations of foreign investment and a postponement of new initi-
atives for freeing capital movements. On the other hand, the establish-
ment of a system of intermember credits for foreign-exchange crises
and the expressed intentions to adopt a plan for currency integration
among EEC members by 1980 indicate that financial integration of
some form may be gaining in priority among the members.
This paper attempts to provide some evidence of the extent to
which intra-EEC capital mobility has tied the financial markets of the
members into a more closely integrated complex. Measures of the
intensity of intra-EEC capital movements relative to other financial
flows are developed and examined for trend. In addition, intercountry
differences and variations in interest rates are examined for indications
of an effective integration process. It is patently clear that integrating
forces going beyond the confines of the EEC, particularly the Euro-
currency and Eurobond markets, have played a substantial role in
NOTE: Financialsupport for this research from the Ford Foundation Grant to New
York University for International Business and Legal Studies is gratefully acknowl-
edged. The final version has benefited from helpful comments by Holger Engberg,
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connectingmore closely the EEC markets, even without an explicit amon
connection with the Common Market integration program. This aspect parti
is also briefly considered.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 the presumed de- relati
ficiencies of European financial markets and the benefits and costs of relati
integrating them are briefly examined. In Section 2 the approach to taken
financial integration taken by the EEC to date is outlined. Sections 3 resulti
and 4 then present some quantitative evidence as to the extent of the recent
integration. In the former the relative intensity of intra-EEC capital marke
movements is examined, and the latter is concerned with the harmoni-




1ADVANTAGES AND COSTS OF FINANCIAL
01[Ufl
INTEGRATION stems
"UNDERDEVELOPED CAPITAL MARKETS their
Financial markets in the EEC countries are typically characterized
to siowJ
as relatively backward in comparison with those in the United States
e
Currenc and United Kingdom. This remains true even though continental Europe
b has had higher ratios of saving and fixed investment to national output n an
than have the Anglo-Saxon countries, and despite evidence that Eu-
.g.,
amount
ropean companies resort to external as opposed to internal finance amon
relatively more often than is done in the United States and Great
Britain.' The most commonly voiced complaints concerning the finan- funds b cia! markets of the EEC countries can be summarized briefly.2It nels of
must be borne in mind, however, that there is considerable diversity nels. Fuà
ISee IraScott,European Capital Markets: Present Structure and Prospects for suppres
Integration, Washington,D.C.,1968, esp.Chapter 7.
2Two official studies have provided a wealth of information on European financial ities,an
markets.These are the OECD Capital Markets Studs', especially Volume Ill. Func- certain
honingof Capital Markets, Paris, 1968; and European Economic Community, The j
Decelopineni of a European Capital Market [known as the Segré Report], Brussels,
1966.See also U.S. Treasury Department, A Description and Analysis of Certain markets
EuropeanCapital Markets, Washington, D.C., 1964; and Kurt 'The
aresult Problemsand Prospects of Integrating European Capital Markets," Journal of Money. .'p
Credit, and Banking, August, 1969. pp. 336—346. COuntries!INTRA-EEC MOVEMENTS AND DOMESTIC MARKETS•53
amongthe markets of the Six, and easy generalizations can .be only
partially correct.
First, the financial markets of the EEC countries are small and
relatively uncompetitive. The small size is a consequence of (I) the
relatively small flow of savings and investment of the EEC members
taken individually, (2) the relatively low stock of outstanding debt and
resulting inadequacy of secondary markets, and (3) the failure until
recently of merging to any considerable degree the separate national
markets into one or more larger ones.
The submarkets within the national markets (the Netherlands
being the possible exception) are generally more highly compart-
mentalized than is true in the United States. This results in a sluggish
transmission of credit pressures from one segment to another, and a
slow and constrained accommodation between the demand and supply
of funds in the submarkets. The excessive domestic segmentation
stems from a number of sources. Important among these are legal,
administrative, and fiscal restraints on the behavior of financial institu-
tions (and others) that limit the scope of their asset portfolios and also
their ability to compete in issuing liabilities. Another factor tending
to slow the transformation to a more highly developed financial system
is the existence of institutional rigidities stemming from a history of
currency instabilities, inflations, and government involvement in the
nonbank financial sector. Also, the government often supplies services
(e.g., pension plans), which has suppressed the mobilization of large
amounts of funds actively seeking high returns and willing to substitute
among assets on the basis of yield.
One result of this is that competition among potential sources of
funds by ultimate borrowers is not very intense and particular chan-
nels of finance are heavily insulated from developments in other chan-
nels. Furthermore, the flow of funds into the long-term capital market is
suppressed by the superstructure of regulations and institutional rigid-
ities, and in some cases a distortive tax structure, which often penalizes
certain types of investments. Nonbank financial institutions have not
developed into the major sources of. long-term funds to the financial
markets that characterizes the United States and United Kingdom. As
a result, secondary markets for marketable securities in most EEC






























54•INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
forces borrowers to use the traditional sources of short-term finance, ,.
mainlybanks, which results in a structure of private finance heavily
weighted in short-term liabilities. e
A reinforcing factor in most EEC countries is the proclivity of the
government and government financial institutions to "preempt" funds
from the long-term segment of financial markets by issuing their own
securities, or securities that are subsidized or guaranteed by the gov-
ernment. This adds to the thinness of the markets for securities not so
favored, and limits the range of choice open to the investor and the al- s
ternatives available to private borrowers.
An important reason for the perpetuation of these characteristics
is that some EEC nations utilize such devices as policy tools to imple- ef
ment national economic programs, or at least to guide real investment
• into preferrecl.Mfannels. The use of financial incentives for such pur-
poses occurs in each of the EEC countries to a greater or lesser degree. tj
It poses a major problem in harmonizing monetary and fiscal policies
among the members and even more of a problem in integrating capital
• markets.3
BENEFITS OF FINANCIAL-MARKET INTEGRATION
Given the characteristics of the national financial markets and the
disparity among the EEC members, "integration" of financial markets 4
(asopposed simply to free currency convertibility and removal of con-
trols over capital outflows) involves a painful process of establishing
• in each member national priorities that are compatible with those of
the others and of harmonizing financial regulations and structures.4 The
expected benefits must then be sizable if the EEC countries are, as it
appears, willing to undertake these burdens.5
• Integration of financial markets, taken to mean that national bor-
rowers and lenders have meaningful alternatives for sources and uses
Milton Gilbert, "Reconciliation of Domestic and International Objectives of Finan-
cial Policy: European Countries," Journalof Finance, May,1963.
See the Segré Report, Chapters 4 and 5.
Atleast one eminent observer of the EEC doubts the advantage of going beyond
the mere freeing of capital flows to positive steps to make national submarkets a part of
a genuine EEC market. See Raymond Bertrand. "A Comment," Journalof Money,
Credit, and Banking, August,1969, pp. 347—349.
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offunds in other countries, may give rise to atleast two identifiable
economic benefits as well as to otheradvantages in the context of
economic integration in general. First, theintegration of financial mar-
kets, by increasing the effective sizeof the market, may lead to opera-
tional economies of scale, i.e., to enhancethe operational efficiency of
the market.6 This means that theeconomic resources employed in
transforming a given amount of savings intoinvestment is reduced. It
may occur by means oflarger underwritings of securities, narrower
specialization by financial institutions, lower cost perunit of obtaining
financial information, and greater competitionin financial markets.
Second, financial-market integration mayimprove the a/locational
efficiency of the financial process. This comesabout because the bor-
rower of one nation has abroader spectrum of sources of funds open to
him, and he may be able to choose acost-repayment combination more
to his liking than would be the caseif he were confined to his national
market. Likewise, the savers may beable to choose a more efficient
risk-return combination by diversifyingtheir asset portfolios inter-
nationally.7 Furthermore, the risk-return spectrumfaced by investors
may itself be transformed as aresult of the deepening and widening of
financial markets. Increased secondary-marketactivity, which would
likely accompany integration, may reduceanticipated fluctuations in
yields and reduce the risk with constant return.To the extent that or-
ganized money and capital markets become moreactive with integra-
tion, the liquidity of marketable securitiesis increased and the "money
risk" reduced.
Another result of improving allocationalefficiency is that discori-
tinuities in the range of available financingwhich existed in isolated
national markets may disappear with integration.The maximum size of
firm that can be financed is increased,if the rationalization of industry
structure is a goal of the integration process, asit is in the EEC, an
integrated financial market may be necessary toprovide financing for
the optimum-sized, large firms thatwould result.
Integration of financial markets may thus be animportant comple-
ment to the integration of goods andlabor markets. By equalizing bor-
6Onthese points, see A. W. Sametz, "TheCapital Markets," in M. Polakoff, ed.,
Financial Institutions and Markets,Boston,1970.
TSeeH. G. Grubel,"Internationally Diversified Portfolios," AmericanEconomic
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rowing costs among countries, competitive distortions among firms,
based on nationality, are reduced. Integrated financial markets would
permit the optimum location of new industry to. minimize transport
costs, an optimization that might not be possible with a customs union
.1 alone.
THE COSTS OF INTEGRATION
Integration carries considerable costs in independence and soy-
ereignty over economic policy for the integrating nations.8 Integration
of financial markets involves a loss of independence in two basic areas;
a loss which at least some of the EEC members have been reluctant to
sustain. First, the degree to which an individual nation may influence
its own monetary aggregates in the pursuit of independent economic
stabilization is greatly reduced. This would be true whether a cur-
rency union were quickly established early in the integration process or
a slower step-by-step removal of controls over capital flows and elimi-
nation of distortive regulations and taxation policies were used as the
strategy to accomplish the integration. The ability, for example, of one
member to lower interest rates while rates of other members were
rising would be circumscribed if, in fact, alternative sources and uses
of funds were readily available without reference to nationality. Simi-
larly, the supply of credit within one member nation could not be in-
dependently determined if full integration existed. Despite. the ten-
dencies in the EEC to eliminate external investment controls, members
retain enough independence in the formulation and execution of
monetary policy to prevent an advanced state of integration of financial
markets.9
A second facet of.the loss of national policy independence involves
the ability to guide the flow of saving into preferred channels of invest-
ment. Some EEC countries rely heavily on the control of the allocation
5These costs are succinctly described in Richard N. Cooper, "Toward an Interna-
tional Capital Market," Yale Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 68, July.
1969.
°SeeSamuel I. Katz, ExternalSurpluses, Capital Flows and Credit Policy in the
EEC, 1958 to /967,Princeton Studies in International Finance No. 22, Princeton.
N.J., 1969. Also, see Scott, op.cit., PartII.
-.
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ofcredit to influence the structure of investmentspending. While,
theoretically, fiscal incentives could be substituted for selectivecredit
• policies, in practice the latter are both politically andadministratively
more feasible.
This conflict between financial integration andindependence in
• controlling the allocation of credit is magnified because the EEC mem-
bers have rather different types of financial structuresand institutions.
And the structural goals that are the object of allocationalcredit policy
also differ from member to member. Thus, a high. degreeof financial-
market integration must inevitably reduce the efficacy of acredit policy
designed to produce a desired allocation of real resources. Iffinancial
markets are to be integrated, either the selective creditcontrols must
be given up in favor of economic efficiency or thestructural priorities
of the integrating members must be.made
2THEEEC APPROACH TO FINANCIAL-MARKET
INTEGRATION
IN ThEabstract,the integration of financial markets may be accom-
plished via two routes, depending upon the nature&the domestic mar-
kets of the members. Take, on the one hand, a situation in whichthe 4
domesticfinancial markets of the members are themselves highly in-
tegrated and efficient, and are without noticeably distortive regulation
or monopoly elements. In such a situation, thefreeing of all barriers to
intraunion flows of funds in only one submarket (say the money market)
will accomplish a high degree of integration in all of the financial mar-
kets of the members.
If, on the other hand, the domestic financial markets of the inte-
grating members are compartmentalized with little communication
among the submarkets, direct integration amongthe members of one
segment of the national markets will be insufficientfor full financial-
market integration. Rather, two alternatives exist. One is to rationalize
the domestic markets and subsequently to integrate via one submarket.
0The latter is precisely what is recommended by the Segré Report (Chapters5 and 6)r
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The other is to attempt to integrate each of the submarkets by eliminat-
ing barriers to international flows while leaving largely unchanged the t
domestic market segmentation. t
The EEC countries have more closely approximated the latter
approach in the 1960's. Economists have, however, analyzed the
former situation much more extensively. Their concern has been to
explicate the balance-of-payments adjustment process when an ab-
stract international investment moves frictionlessly among union
members with "perfect" financial markets." The EEC has avoided the
alternative of establishing early in the integration process a monetary
union in favor of a more piecemeal approach. This has involved the
removal of explicit restrictions on capital movements and the loosen-
ing of some regulatory impediments that have tended to keep financial
institutions from favoring foreign borrowers or lenders. Indeed, the
Segré Report recognized the close approximation of the EEC coun-
tries to the second situation above and recommended that a broad
range of members' submarkets be integrated in parallel.
The Rome Treaty is vague concerning the obligations of the mem-
bers with respect to capital-market integration. It commits the mern-
bers only to progressively abolish restrictions on intra-EEC capital
movements to the extent necessary "to ensure the proper functioning
of the Common Market." 12 Although the common market in corn-
modities was completed in 1969, the progress toward financial-market S
integrationhas been slow, and as will be seen below, of fairly small
magnitude. Furthermore, policy measures taken as a result of the cur-
rency crises and exchange-rate adjustments of 1968 and 1969 resulted
in a temporary disintegration of financial markets.
The movement to eliminate explicit restrictions on international
capital movements has been much more visible than have efforts to
break down discriminatory portfolio regulations and other measures
that have segmented the domestic financial markets of such members
"The literature here is voluminous. See particularly R. I. McKinnon and W. F. Oates,
Theimplications of international Economic integration for Monetary, Fiscal,and
Exchange-Rate Policy, PrincetonStudies in International Finance No. 16, Princeton,
[4
N.J.,1966; N. M. Mintz, MonetaryUnion and Economic Integration, NewYork a4
University, Institute of Finance Bulletin No. 64, New York, 1970; and Cooper, op.cit.
12 Article67 of the Rome Treaty. For a more detailed evaluation of the obligations
of the members, see E. S. Kirschen eta!., Financial Integration in Western Europe,
NewYork, 1969, pp. 42—46.
e
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as France, Italy, and Belgium. For example, exchange controls es-
tablished during World War II were gradually relaxed and free ex- r
ternalconvertibility restored in 1958. Retained, however, was a com-
plex of controls over foreign investment by residents as well as some
degree of control over investment from abroad. The vague commitment
in the Rome Treaty to eliminate these controls led to the adoption of
two directives of the EEC Commission (1960 and 1962). These obli-
gated the member countries to remove restrictions on certain types of
foreign investments: direct investment, dividend and interest payments
and repatriations of foreign investments, loans to finance international
trade, portfolio securities listed on securities exchanges, and transac-
tions involving real estate. Not liberalized were new securities issues
by a resident of one country on the securities markets of another, ac-
counts (deposits) with foreign financial institutions, and certain other
short-term investments. Thus, by 1969, each country (aside from Ger-
many) still retained regulations on the sales of new foreign securities
to residents and, in some instances, other types of lending to for-
eigners.13 In addition, indirect discrimination against foreign borrowers
in the form of double taxation on investment income still exists.
The EEC Commission attempted further to liberalize capital flows
through a third directive, which would obligate each member to permit
foreign new issues on its securities markets equal to a minimum per-
centage of all new public issues. This directive has not, however, been
adopted by the member countries.
The limited success in achieving integration of financial markets
plus the disruption of the process with currency crises and parity
changes have contributed to recent decisions by the EEC to adopt a
program of gradual monetary union. The initial steps were to create
intermember credit lines and acceptance of a commitment to pool a
part of international reserves and to eliminate gradually the range of
fluctuation in exchange rates among the members. This avenue, if
implemented, would force individual members to remove additional
regulations on intra-EEC capital flows and to harmonize domestic
policies with respect to credit markets. In addition, this sequence, by
reducing the range (and likelihood) of changes in the exchange rate,
SeeOECD, Codeof Liberalization of Capital Movement, Paris,1969.
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would partially or wholly remove another factor tending to isolate fi-
nancial markets.
It is important to note that allpastmeasures to liberalize capital'
movements taken by EEC members have not discriminated against
nonmember countries. That is, removing restrictions on' certain types
of foreign investment were made to apply to all such investments re-
gardless of recipient ëountry—EEC member or not. In addition, cx-
change-rate variability was the same among the member countries as
it was between members and nonmembers, thus' giving no relative in-
centive for intra-EEC capital flows. The result, which one might expect,
is that the EEC has become more integrated with the financial markets'
of other advanced countries in general, including each other, but not
simply integrated on a regional basis.
However, the question posed here is whether the EEC countries
have achieved a degree of financial-market integration higher than
among the developed countries generally. Some factors suggest that
this might be the case, even though the policy changes made by the r
EEC and the major integrating devices of the Eurodollar and Euro-
bond markets have not been confined to the EEC countries. The very
movement toward integration of product and labor markets may have
been accompanied by an acceleration of intra-EEC capital flows. Em-
proved information on investment opportunities in other member
countries, some degree of tax harmonization, and attempts to harmo-
nize antitrust laws and encourage unionwide mergers would generally
tend to intensify intra-EEC finaticial flows. In addition, some institu-
tions of the EEC itself—such as, the European Development Bank,
the 'High Commission of the Eurbpean' Coal and Steel Community, and
the Common Agricultural Fund—tend to raise the intra-EEC flow of
funds. By so doing,' the separate'national markets are tied more closely
together. '
3INTRA-EECCAPITAL FLOWS
TWO separate bodies of evidence are examined to shed light on the
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members,relative to total flows of capital between the member coun-
tries and all other countries. My hypothesis is that relatively greater
financial-market integration among EEC countries would be accom-
panied by a higher proportion of intra-EEC capital movements relative
to capital movements with all countries. The second type of evidence
is the similarity of interest-rate movements in EECcountries.Closer
integration should, in theory, be accompanied by a narrowing of yield
differentials among the members brought about by increased actual or
potential intra-EEC capital flows. By extension, the narrowing of
interest-rate differentials would also cause a closer coincidence (in
time) of interest-rate movements among countries. The evidence on
interest rates is presented in Section 4.
Consistent data on intra-EEC capital flows are notoriously defi-
cient. Balance-of-payments figures constitute the most comparable and
complete information on the matter, but even here the extent of cover-
age, comparability among countries, and the time span of detailed series
requires that they be used with care and the usual caveats.
PRIVATELONG-TERM CAPITAL FLOWS
Dataon long-term private capital flows are available on a geo-
graphic basis for all of the EEC members for 1963 and thereafter,
while comparable data for the three financially important countries— 4
WestGermany, France,' and the Netherlands—extend back to 1960.
The latter year is a reasonable starting point. The first steps imple-
menting the Rome Treaty had been taken in 1959; the return to con-
vertibility of 1958 had been absorbed; and all of the explicit measures
toward liberalization of capital flows under the auspices of the EEC
did not begin to' occur until 1960. The unavailability of meaningful
data for the period prior to 1960 precludes a comparison with the
earlier period in any event.
For purposes of this paper, private long-term capital is defined to
include direct investment, portfolio investment, and other loans and
credits with an original maturity of one year or more.'4 Gross inflows
Theonly exception is that long-term bank loans to foreigners are excluded, but
this omission is not critical. EEC country banks make few loans to foreigners.
except for the Netherlands, and even then the flow is negligible relative to the others.62 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
TABLE 1





Per Cent of Per Cent of
Total in Total by
Amount Other EEC Amount Other EEC
Year ($ millions) Countries ($ millions) Countries
Germany, France and the Netherlands
All EEC Countries









1963 522 49 1,507 23
1963 1,023 38 2,998 15
1964 1,014 34 2,907 23
1965 1,314 43 2,450 25
1966 1,814 35 2,191 34



















SOURCE: Compiled from Statistical Office of the European Communities,
Balances of Payments, 1958—I 967, Brussels, 1968; EEC Commission, The
Development of a European Capital Market, Brussels, 1966, Table 14; and
Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsberichten, Statistische Beihefte, September,
1969.
and outflows (net of repayments) are treated separately; the measures
used, then, are flows of investment funds into and out of the individual
member countries.
The summary measures are shown in Table 1. The table is divided
into two parts, the lower one showing the annual inflows and outflows
for all EEC countries from 1963 to 1967, and the upper one contain-
ing data only for Germany; France, and the Netherlands for 1960 to
1963. The table shows the dollar equivalent of the outflows and in-
flows and the percentages of each accounted for by outflows to and
inflows from EEC members.I INTRA-EECMOVEMENTS AND DOMESTIC MARKETS 63
The tablereflects,of course, the fact that capital inflows in the
early and mid-1960's greatly exceeded capital outflows. It also re-
flects the absolute decline in foreign investment in the EEC countries
after 1963. This decline was largely the result of the U.S. interest
equalization tax and, later, the foreign-investment restrictions that re-
— ducedthe volume of new American investment in the EEC. As the
of absolute volume of long-term capital inflows from the United States
declined, the percentage accounted for by the other EEC members
rose fairly consistently, so that intra-EEC investment as a percentage
S of total long-term capital receipts of EEC members was substantially
•— higherin 1966—67 than earlier.
• Foreign investment by EEC members was relatively stable until
1965, when a rapid expansion occurred, mainly from Germany. There
is no observable trend in the proportion of outflows from EEC mem-
bers going to other members. If anything, the tendency has been for
the percentage to fall; i.e., EEC foreign investment in nonmember
countries has tended to rise faster than such investment in member
• countries.
These trends are evident also in the average rate of change in the
flows of private long-term investment. From 1963 to 1967, the average
annual rate of growth in intra-EEC long-term capital flows was about
— 14per cent. Foreign investment by EEC members in all countries grew
at about 23 per cent per year, while total foreign investment in EEC
countries from all sources declined by about 4 per cent per year. Thus,
the evidence as to the pace of capital market integration derived from
the aggregate data on private long-term capital flows is somewhat
mixed. As a proportion of capital inflows, intra-EEC movements
es tended to increase; as a proportion of capital outflows, they tended
•ial to decline.
Some additional indication of the changes in interpenetration of
ed financial markets can be obtained from these data by comparing them
• with fixed capital formation in the EEC countries, or with total do-
mestic savings of the members. To the extent that changes in total say-
to ings and investment are accompanied by similar relative changes in
in- financial flows, investment and saving can serve as an indication of
nd financial flows. For the three years 1960 to 1962, the gross long-term
capital inflows into EEC countries was equivalent to between 8 and
Sr
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10 'per cent of fixed capital formation (excluding residential construc-
tion).15 The inflows from EEC members amounted to 2—3 per cent of
fixed investment. Despite the rapid average growth in capital formation'
in the EEC (about 6.5 per cent per year from 1958—67) the 14 per cent
annual growth in intra-EEC long-term investment was greater, thus
raising the intra-EEC capital flow somewhat, but not above the rela-
tively low figure of 5 per cent of total capital formation. This suggests
that there was a very moderate increase in the interdependence of the
financial markets of the EEC during the period of integration, at least
until 1967—68.
The private long-term capital flows 'of the individual member
countries are shown in Table 2. The period 1960 to 1967 (1968 for
Germany) 'is broken into three subperiods to avoid the distortions of
special factors that affect individual years.
In'general, the individual country data 'confirm the findings based
on the aggregate data that (1) there is no consistent upward movement
in the relative importance of intra-EEC capital outflowsinthe total
(indeed, France and the Netherlands show marked downward move-
ments), and (2) capital inflowsfromEEC members have taken on
somewhat greater importance, especially for Italy and the Netherlands.
There are two particular circumstances that distort the data in
Table 2. First, the French data on capital outflows indicate a sustained
net repayment on the foreign securities held by the French. Indeed,
these reductions 'in 'French holdings of foreign securities were greater
than gross new acquisitions in some of the earlier years, thus turning
the total outflow of portfolio capital into a negative figure. At the
same time, France acquired, net, some new securities of her EEC
This distortion explains the rapid fall in the importance of
EEC outflows in the total for France from period to period. Similarly,
the unusually high figure for capital inflows from the EEC to Italy in
1966—67 was again the result of a running down (repayment) of Italian
debt held in non-EEC countrits.
Aside from these special cases, the degree of dependence on capi-
tal flows with the EEC partners relative to the total is strikingly similar
(20—30 per cent of total inflows or outflows) for each member except
Calculatedfrom data in OECD, Statisticsof National Accounts, /952—62, Paris,
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SOURCE: Compiledfrom Statistical Office of the European
Balance of Payments,1958—1967, Brussels,
1968; EEC Commission, The Development of a European Capi-
ta! Market, Brussels, 1966, Table 14; and Deutsche Bundes-
bank, Monatsberichten, Statistische Beihefte, September, 1969.
a Denotes that last period covers 1966—68 rather than 1966—
67 as for other countries.
'Datais unavailable.
Data for BLEU for 1963 and 1964 includes an unspecified
amount of short-term capital.
Belgium-Luxembourg (BLEU). The latter sends by far the highest
portion of her foreign investment to other members, but there is no
indication that this proportion has increased in the course of imple-
menting the,Rome Treaty.
To summarize, there is little evidence that a dramatic shift in the
structure of private capital flows has occurred during the
period since the formation of the EEC, although it appears that the
intensity of intra-EEC flows has risen slightly relative to inflows from
TABLE 2
Private Long-Term Capital Flows by Country: Intra-EEC
as Per Cent of Total
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outside the area. And the evidence suggests that no one country has a
disproportionately large dependence on her partners 'as a source or a F
use of foreign investment funds. The possible exceptions are Italy and
BLEU, on opposite sides.
It may be argued that the inclusion of direct investment together
with portfolio investments and long-term credits in one category con-
ceals potential evidence of financial integration. Direct investment
flows, and their geographic structure, may depend on one set of van-
ables, including the competition and merger policy of the EEC Com-
mission, while indirect long-term investment is a function of other
variables, including monetary policies, regulations applied to fiñan-
cial institutions and the like. Indirect investment may be more relevant
as an indication of financial marketintegration.
Unfortunately, data that disaggregate direct and indirect invest-
ment are not available for each member for the entire period, however,
consistent dissaggregation is possible for the most financially important C
members. This is shown in Table 3. There the average annual capital
inflows and outflows for all countries are shown, and the proportion
of it accounted for by direct investment. In addition, the percentages
of direct and indirect investment by EEC countries are shown sepa-
rately.
The data indicate that direct and indirect investment were roughly
evenly split and relatively stable in their total outflows. There was a
sharp rise in the proportion of direct investment by these countries
going to the EEC in 1963—65,buta retrenchment in 1966—67. More
relevant, however, is that portfolio outflows to the EEC as a per cent J
oftotal fell even more and were still relatively low in 1966—67.
As for capital inflows, direct investment as a per cent of total
inflows rose dramatically in the middle period, and leveled off there-
after. And the proportion of direct and indirect inflows accounted for
by EEC members appears to have undergone inverse cycles. The EEC
indirect investment percentage rose substantially from 1960—62 to
1963—65,andthen fell, but less than it had risen. This reflects partially
the United States policy of stemming capital outflows, which lowered
the gross flow of American portfolio investment in the EEC after 1962.
Intra-EEC direct investment as a per cent of inflows, on the other hand,
ti' fell in the middle period and partially recovered in the more recent one.INTRA-EEC MOVEMENTS AND DOMESTIC MARKETS 67
TABLE3
SOURCE: Compiledfrom Statistical Office
Balancesof Payments,1958—1967, Brussels,
Developmentof aEuropeanCapita!Market,
of the European Communities,
1968;EEC Commission, The
Brussels,1966, Table 14; and
p
Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsberichten, Statistische Beihefte, September,
1969.
Better evidence is available on thedegreeof interpenetration of
capital markets from new issues data and portfolio capital flows. In-
tegration of financial markets certainly requires that both new issues
of securities and trade in secondary markets be free of national dis-
crimination. Table 4 presents data on the total public issues of securi-
ties for the EEC countries as compared with international portfolio
4 ,-
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Foreign DirectInvestment and "Other" Private Long-TermCapital Flows





(annual average, in millions of dol-
lars) 1,280 1,372 1,847
Direct investment as a per cent of
total inflow 36 64 60
lntra-EEC direct investment as a per
cent of total from all areas 30 24 27
Intra-EEC portfolio and other long-
term as a per cent of total from all
areas 25 38 31
Capital Outflows
Total private long-term capital out-
flows (annual average in millions of
dollars) 688 858 1,409
Direct investment as a per cent of
total outflow 50 52 49
Intra-EEC direct investment as a per
cent of total to all areas 30 40 33
lntra-EEC portfolio and other long-
term capital as a per cent of total to
all areas 52 5 20
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TABLE4
r
Net Infiows of Capital on Account of
Public Net
Portfolio investment








(as % of net
Year ($ millions) issues) ($ millions) securities issues)
1963 8,880 14 163 1.8
1964 10,360 2 112 1.1
1965 11,670 2 152 1.3
1966 10,980
a 143 1.3
1967 12,810 3 98 0.8
SOURCES: NetPublicIssues—Europeaninvestment Bank, Annual Re-
port, variousissues. Portfolio Ca pita! Flows —EECStatistical Office, National
Accountsand Balances of Payments, /958—1967.
a Negligible.
investment in the EEC for the I 963-67 period. While the data are not
strictly comparable, the trends shown are, no doubt, valid. The data
show a steady rise of new public issues. When such issues are compared
with portfolio investment in the EEC countries from outside, it is seen
that there was a sharp drop after 1963, when the American market was
made unattractive. From 1964 to 1967, only 2—3 per cent of new issues
was accounted for by foreign portfolio issues.
The evidence is more striking when portfolio inflows from other
EEC members is shown as a percentage of total securities issues.
Here, the figure remained under 2 per cent for each of the five years,
and was very close to only 1 per cent in four of the years. There is no
indication from these data that the capital markets were highly inte-
grated or that they became more so in this period.
The sum of the evidence remains mixed. There is littleevidence
from these admittedly inadequate data that the EEC countries forged
Portfolio Capital Inflows of EEC Countries as Related to
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strongnew ties among' capital markets and investments in the process
of integration prior to 1967. But there was a perceptible tendency for
a slightly larger intra-EEC flow of long-term investments to emerge,
although even this may have been reversed in 1968—69.
PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL-AGENCY LONG-TERM CAPITAL FLOWS
While private long-term capital flows among EEC members show
no marked relative increase, other types of interpenetration of markets
might have occurred. Among these are capital movements resulting
from public sector and international agency operations, discussed here,
and short-term private movements, discussed below.
Government lending and borrowing among EEC countries has
not intensified in the period since 1958. Indeed, the major changes in
public long-term assets and liabilities have been with nonmembers of
the EEC rather than between members)6 Government long-term
foreign assets have risen as aid to developing countries (especially
Germany and France) has expanded, while claims on other EEC mem-
bers have remained constant or have been repaid. Likewise, govern-
ment long-term liabilities to foreigners have decreased (except for
Italy) rather consistently as loans from the United States have been
repaid. Liabilities to other EEC members have changed very little
in absolute terms. long-term government capital flows have not
been an integrating vehicle, nor have official transfer payments among
EEC governments.
Besides government credits and transfers, some institutions of the
EEC may themselves serve as a means of tying the financial markets
of the member countries closer together.'7 These institutions may raise
funds in one country and spend them in another member country.
They include the European Investment Bank, the High Authority of
the ECSC, the Common Agricultural Fund, and the operating budget
of the EEC itself.
Although these activities may have a great future potential to
6Based on balance-of-payments data in EEC Statistical Office, National Accounts
and Balances of Payments. 1958—1967, Brussels, 1968.
° Fora general discussionof these institutions, see Kirschen, op. cit.. Chapter 4.
—r
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redistribute funds among .EEC members, the magnitude has not been
sizable as yet. By far the most important of them has been the EIB. But
even it has served as much as a vehicle for capital inflows from outside
the EEC as it has as a redistributor of funds. From 1961 through 1967,
approximately $1 billion in loans were made by the EIB.18 About half
of these were made in Italy and another 20 per cent to nonmember
countries. Of the funds raised, less than one-half was raised in the EEC
countries themselves; the majority came from bond issues outside of
the EEC. Thus, the scope for the redistribution of funds among the
members has been relatively limited. The other EEC institutions noted
above have been even less of a force.
SHORT-TERM CAPITAL MOVEMENTS
Short-term capital movements were generally decontrolled by the
member countries in the early stages of the EEC. This liberalization
was not, however, restricted to intra-EEC movements but was appli- S.
cable to foreign assets regardless of nationality. Despite this genera!
movement toward liberalization, there have been a number of lapses,
and in 1968 and 1969 at least three countries reinstituted controls over
short-term money inflows or outflows.19
Data are not available with which to appraise the degree of change q
in the interdependence of EEC money markets. It seems likely that S
interdependence has risen as coordination of monetary policy among
the member countries became more highly developed. But there is
little evidence to suggest that the member nations have given up the tj
ability to control to a substantial degree their own short-term money
market conditions. Indeed, a principal reason for the reinstitution of
controls in 1968 and 1969 was to insulate the German, French, and tl
Italian money markets from external pressures. j
8 EuropeanInvestment Bank, Annual Report, /967, Brussels, 1968.
Thisis not the place to examine the measures employed by the national governments
to control and manipulate short-term capital inflows and outflows. For a review of these
practices, see R. H. Mills, Jr., "The Regulation of Short-term Capital Movements:
Western European Techniques in the 1960's," Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Staff StudyNo.46, Washington, D.C., 1968; and Katz, op. cit., esp.
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THEEURODOLLAR AND EURO-ISSUES MARKETS
Without doubt, the major integrative vehicles among national
money and capital markets have been, respectively, the Eurodollar
and Eurobond markets. These markets have strengthened the inter-
dependence of national interest rates and credit conditions. The Euro-
dollar market was the principal means by which American monetary
stringency in 1966 and again in 1968—69 was transferred to Europe.
Likewise the increase in borrowing by American firms in the Eurobond
market in 1968 served to tighten credit supplies in the long-term credit
markets.
In both instances, a closer tie between American and European
financial markets was forged. But it does not necessarily follow that
the Eurodollar and Eurobond markets have produced separate and
additional integration of EEC financial markets beyond the generally
closer common ties to American markets. A number of considerations
suggest the lack of any special integrating mechanism. For example,
some EEC countries have taken explicit steps to insulate their own
money markets from conditions in the Eurodollar market.2° And EEC
companies have not been major issuers of Eurobonds. Exclusive of
EIB issues, the peak borrowing in the Eurobond market by EEC
companies was $420 million in 1967, a negligible percentage of total
securities issued by such companies. On the demand side of the Euro-
bond market, the proportion of new issues acquired in EEC countries
has been rising, but there is no precise evidence on how much of the
total issues have been taken by EEC residents.2' The lack of an active
secondary market in Eurobonds limits the degree to which long-term
interest rates may be tied together by this international market, a!-
though this may be changing.
Thus, while the "international" money and capital markets have
been influences tending to integrate markets, they have not as yet
brought about a high degree of interdependence in the EEC. They
have been more effective between hemispheres than within Europe.
20Katz,op.cii., pp. 20—29.
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4HARMONIZATIONOF INTEREST RATES
IF SUBSTANTIAL integration of financial markets occurred during the
period of establishing the EEC, one result would be that interest rates
in the member countries would have moved closer together and fluc-
tuated in more similar patterns. This could have been induced by a
sizable increase in intra-EEC capital flows, or, in competitive markets,
by simply the potential for such. capital movements. The similarity
among members in levels and movements of interest rates would have
increased as integration occurred.
It is widely accepted that from the mid-1950's to the mid-1960's
the differentials among national interest rates (both long and short
term) of the EEC countries were somewhat reduced.22 In 1967—69,
however, the differentials widened dramatically.
Statistical measurements of a tendency for national interest rates
to converge or diverge must, by nature, be somewhat arbitrary. Richard
Cooper23 has calculated the standard deviation and coefficient of
variation of short- and long-term interest rates for eight countries for
various years. There is an observable tendency for the national interest
rates to cluster closer to the mean rate until 1968. This result, however,
is partially due to the closing of the differential between European
rates and rates in the United States and Canada. The latter countries
were included in his sample.
I have calculated the (unweighted) average of national interest-
rate differentials between each pair, of EEC members for each year
from 1960 to 1969. The results are shown in Table 5.From1960 to
the mid-1960's, there was a measurable tendency for interest differen- a
tials to narrow. Since 1963, however, no sustained additional narrow-
ing has occurred. Rather, in 1966 and again in 1969, the averagediffer-
ence between national rates widened considerably, to levels comparable
with those in the early 1960's. In sum, while there is some observed
tendency for differentials between interest rates of EEC members to
narrow, that tendency was not strong, irreversible, or even sustained
over the period of integration.
22 For more detail on this period, see W. D. McClam, "Interest Rates: Their Inter-







1960 1.03 . 1965 .88
1961 1.08 1966 1.07
1962 .90 1967 .92
1963 .72 1968 .73
1964 .87 1969b 1.00
SOURCE:Calculated from "AverageInterest
Rates for the National Economy" presented in Union
Bank of Switzerland, An International Survey of In-
terest Rates: Patterns and Differentials, Zurich, 1970,
Table 34. The rates presented there are averages of
selected borrowing and lending rates for each cOuntry.
aThe"average differential" is the sum of the dif-
ferences between each pair of country rates for a given
year divided by 10 (the total number of pairs).
Through June.
While the narrowing average spreads between EEC interest rates
may be a weak indication of financial integration, stronger evidence
would require a greater similarity in movements of rates among coun-
tries. Long-term and short-term interest rate movements for each of
the EEC members were, therefore, compared with each other, as well
as with the United States. The interest rate series are those published
by the IMF.24 The series are for yields on short-term government
securities and on long-term government bonds with roughly twenty-
year maturities. Average quarterly yields were employed.
Three separate time periods were defined so that comparisons
could be made between periods. The first period covered 1957 to 1962.
This represented the period of negotiation and early implementation
ofmeasures to establish the Common Market and is not.expeçted
24InternationalMonetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. Average quarterly
yields on short-term and long-term government securities were the rates used.
I ..— .'
.
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TABLE 5
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to indicate high interconnections between EEC capital markets. The
second period covers 1963 to 1967, and contains the years when
financial integration was thought to be advancing rapidly. For the sake
of additional comparison, a third period was defined to cover 1963
through the first quarter of 1969. The additional five quarters contained
the period of the unrest in France, the ensuing franc crises, and the
speculation on the revaluation of the mark. During 1968—69 there were
no new initiatives toward liberalization of financial flows and some
restrictions were reintroduced.
To test the degree of similarity in interest rate movements in the
three periods, simple correlation coefficients were computed between
each country's interest rates and those of each other EEC member
(and the United States).25 The results for the long-term government
bond yields are shown in Table 6. The matrix of correlation coefficients
has three entries for each combination of countries; one for each of
the periods. The correlations of the United States rates with each of
the EEC member's rates are also shown.
The evidence as to whether long-term interest rates moved in
closer harmony in the 1963—67 period than in the earlier period is by
no means definitive. For six of the pairs of coefficients, the 1963—67
is higher than earlier. In general, BLEU rates behaved much more like
those of the other EEC members, and the German and Dutch rates
also were more closely harmonized. On the other hand, Italian bond
yields were further out of step after 1963 than earlier, as was the -j
Germanwith the French. Thus, in some important instances, the in-
dication is that financial market integration was insufficient to tie bond
yields much closer together.
In virtually every instance, the addition of data for 1968—69 re-
• duced the coefficients from those for the 1963—67 period. As expected,
the disruptions caused by balance-of-payments disequilibrium and
foreign-exchangedisturbances were disintegrativeand produced
divergent movements in interest rates.
The coefficients also suggest that the pairs of countries with close
association between interest rates and those pairs with little correlation
changed from period to period. Thus the German rate was highly
correlated with those of France and Italy in 1957—62 but not in 1963—
These computationswere carried outbyJames Farrell. cINTRA-EEC MOVEMENTS AND DOMESTIC MARKETS 75
TABLE 6
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Similarity of Long-Term Interest Rate Movements Among Countries: Simple











1957—62 .76 .78 .76—
1963—67 .83 .79 .22
1963—691 .57 .83 .22
BLEU
1957—62 .57 .48 .41 .37
1963—67 .66 .73 .47 .89
1963—691 .63 .48 .45 .85
United States
1957—62 —.73 —.75 —.81 —.42 —.48
1963—67 .58 .76 .10 .86 .71
1963—691 .15 .87 .11 .84 .43
67. Similarly, there was little association between the BLEU rate and
the Dutch rate in the early period, but a high correlation later. Such
shifts also imply an absence of strong unionwide integration in financial
markets.
It is interesting to note that the coefficients between the yields
in the United States and those in all of the EEC countries were nega-
tive in the early period, as American rates generally tended upward
while the European rates generally declined. The movements in Amer-
ican rates from 1963 to 1967 were as much like those of the EEC
members, except Italy, as the rates in the EEC countries were similar
to each other. This would suggest that there is no additional degree of
capital-market integration among the EEC members.
4
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1957—62 .43 —.43 —.29
1963—67 .73 .67 .78
1963—691 .70 .27 .67
United States
1957—62 .08 —.37 .12 —.18
1963—67 .64 .53 .86 .67
1963—691 .08 .76 .79 .36
The correlation coefficient matrix for the short-term interest rates
is shown in Table 7. Italy is omitted because a comparable rate was
not published for the entire period.
It appears that the money-market rates were less similar than long-
term rates throughout each of the periods. Otherwise, the results in
Table 7 yield the same implications as those in Table 6. There is some
indicatjon of.closer connection in the 1963—67 period than earlier,
but again with one notable exception—France and the Netherlands.
Another important pair of countries—Germany and France—had a
surprisingly low correlation between money-market rates, even in the
1963—67 period. And as one would also expect, when the data for
1968—69 is added, the coefficients are much lower, reflecting the op-
posite direction of movements among some of the rates, most impor-
tantly the French and German.
The coincidence of movements of short-term rates in the United
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that of the bond yields. Movements in American rates were much more
similar to those in the EEC countries in 1963—67 than earlier, and,
in fact, as similar to each as the EEC members' were to each other.
5CONCLUSION
THERE is little convincing evidence that the financial markets of the
EEC countries became very much more integrated during the first
decade of the EEC. Although there have been positive actions taken
to eliminate explicit restrictions on capital movements, to ease port-
folio restrictions and other regulations that suppress capital flows, and
to harmonize fiscal and financial policies among the members, most of
these actions have been designed to facilitate, not intra-EEC capital
flows specifically, but international flows in general. The data give no
evidence whatsoever that the intensity of financial integration was
greater among the members than between the members and non-
members.
Capital movements statistics show some, but not a substantial, in-
crease in the intensity of intra-EEC movements in recent years. Also,
the evidence as to the degree to which EEC interest rate differentials
have narrowed and the national rates move in tandem suggests only
a slight increase in interconnections as the Common Market was es-
tablished. Both sets of evidence, however, show a noticeable disin-
tegration after 1967.
The slow pace of integration of financial markets within the Com-
munity is primarily the result of reluctance on the part of member
governments to give up a measure of independence in aggregate credit
policy or the ability to use financial markets and policies to influence
the allocation of funds. The reversal of even this weak tendency
toward greater integration in 1968—69 reflects the appearance of
balance-of-payments disequilibria and the governments' responses
to them. The in policy independence, of financial integration
appear low so long as there are no conflicts between policies for
external and internal balance. For the EEC generally, there was no
conflict until 1968, because there was an almost universal payments78 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
surplus. But once deficits became a matter of concern, measures to
CL
integrate financial markets were the first to be reversed. The costs then
seemed too high.
The proposal to establish a monetary union for the EEC, if adopted
m
and implemented, will change the picture radically. Financial integra- tr
tion will come about concurrently. But monetary union can be viewed tr
as a strategy by which the sovereign independence over domestic
e
money and credit policies is transferred to EEC institutions; i.e., given









The papers by Professors Cohen and Hawkins are mainly of a tr
factual and statistical character and are essentially noncontroversial.
Cohen deals chiefly with the changing pattern of Britain's long-term
m
capital movements, including government loans and grants, since the ot
early 1950's. Hawkins examines the flows of long-term capital of the tht
countries in the European Economic Community within the framework
B
of the larger problem of EEC capital-market integration. gr
A major—indeed the major—theme or conclusion of Cohen's to.
paper, recurring time and again, is that since the 1950's Britain has
increasingly shifted from its traditional role as an "international long-
term investor," or an "originator" or "source" of long-term capital
(these are Cohen's terms), to what he variously describes as its almost
exclusive role today as an "entrepôt," "middleman," or "intermediary"
for long-term investment funds. Now I would at once agree that these
are apt descriptions so far as concerns Britain's role in the Eurobond
market. In that market Britain uses its institutional facilities to bring te
together foreign borrowers and investors in dollar-denominated bonds
floated in London, using virtually no funds of its own. And in the Euro- ofCOMMENT BY BLOOMFIELD •79
currency market it also serves as a middleman by lending to nonresi-
dents the great bulk of the foreign-currency deposits lodged with it.
But I think it misleading to assert that Britain has become solely a
I middleman when considering other categories of international capital
• transactions. Here, it seems to me, Britain continues to perform its
traditional role, despite the reduced volume of its net long-term capital
exports, as a percentage of GNP and other relevant variables, corn-
pared with what it was before 1929. Cohen justifIes his use of the term
- middlemanhere on what seems to me to be a number of dubious
grounds.
First, he calls attention to the fact that the margin between gross
long-term capital outflows and gross long-term capital inflows (by
which he really means the margin between the net outflows of British
capital and the net inflows of foreign capital) has been comparatively
small and has been narrowing over the period. But why are the two
linked or paired off? They are distinct flows and take place indepen-
dently. There is nothing in an act of foreign investment in Britain that
accounts directly for an act of British investment abroad. There is no
middleman role here, as in the case of the Eurobond and Eurocurrency
a transactions. To be sure, if the inflows of foreign investment were
smaller, Britain would probably have had to restrict its capital outflows
more severely. But this would presumably have been equally true had
e other credit items in the British balance of payments been smaller
than they actually were. Even less relevant is Cohen's argument that
• Britain's alleged middleman role is further evidenced by the geo-
• graphical pattern of its long-term capital outflows—which went mainly
S to sterling countries —andof its long-term capital inflows —whichcame
S chiefly from nonsterling countries.
• Cohen further argues in support of his use of the term middleman
that Britain's net long-term capital exports are increasingly dependent
upon net short-term borrowing from abroad. In general, however,
Britain has not been borrowing short and lending long so far as con-
e cerns its operations in sterling. Foreign sterling balances in Britain, net
d of short-term sterling claims abroad and excluding holdings of the In-
g ternational Monetary Fund, have remained relatively constant for the
S past twenty years, during which Britain has been a regular net exporter
of long-term capital. Of course, if foreign sterling balances had de-80INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
dined over the period, Britain would have undoubtedly had to cut p
down the scale of its net exports of long-term capital, but even this 1
hardly seems to justify the use of the term middleman. As it happens, n
Cohen is able to establish his claim that net long-term capita! exports
have been increasingly matched by what he calls "net short-term a
borrowing abroad" by including in this term, not only the (relatively a
modest) changes in foreign sterling balances, but also the changes in h
Britain's gold and convertible-currency reserves, the transactions c
with the IMF, and even the errors and omissions item—in short, by Si
including everything in the balance of payments except net long-term in
capital exports and the current-account balance. ti
Cohen discusses briefly Britain's "capacity" as a net exporter of lo
long-term capital. He tells us bluntly that this capacity is limited by
Britain's current-account surplus, and that the only way to increase CI
long-term capital exports is to increase that surplus. This is one way, th
and a common way, of looking at the matter, but it is not one that ta
• would command universal acceptance. It could also be argued that a di
country's capacity to export long-term capital should be related, not di
to the state of its current-account balance, but to its real wealth, savings, Pt
and development; and that the current-account balance should be ad-
justed to the free outflow of long-term capital, thereby permitting an
appropriate transfer of the real resources, rather than the other way
around. However, I would admit that there are in fact many practical
advantages in choosing to adjust the capital account to the current
account. 01
At the end of his paper, Cohen attempts to measure the relative alli
costs to Britain of restrictions on capital exports, restrictions on the nol
trade account, and domestic-demand reduction as means of correcting thd,
balance-of-payments deficits. His calculations are in terms of national the
income annually foregone by use of each of these three methods. On
this basis, he finds that the least costly method has been the restric- it
tions on capital exports. Apart from the facts that this criterion may
not in itself give us a complete accounting of the relative costs of
capital and trade controls and that the time span he has in mind is not lor4
clear, I question his conclusion that the British authorities, by choosing thai
the route of capital-export restrictions first at times of balance-of- infl#COMMENT BY BLOOMFIELD •81
paymentscrises, perhaps "have known what they were doing after all."
If the authorities really knew what they were doing, they would, in
my opinion, have devalued the pound, not in 1967, but in 1964.
The core of Professor Hawkins' paper lies in his statistical ex-
amination of EEC long-term capital movements and interest rates in
an effort to determine whether appreciable progress can be said to
have been made toward the integration of the capital markets of these
countries since 1960. His conclusion, somewhat mixed though his
statistical results are, is that no marked increase in the degree of capital-
market integration has in fact occurred, despite a substantial liberaliza-
tion of exchange controls and other regulations inhibiting the flow of
f long-term capital and despite the rapid growth of the Eurobond market,
both of which have tended to make the capital markets of developed
countries generally more interdependent. He attributes what he calls
the slow pace of EEC capital-market integration mainly to the reluc-
tance of individual members to relax more rapidly their direct and in-
direct restrictions on the flow of long-term capital, primarily from a
desire to maintain a measure of autonomy in their monetary policy for
purposes of domestic stabilization.
it is not entirely clear what standards Hawkins is applying, in his
various tests relating to capital movements, to determine what would
constitute an appreciable rate of progress towards EEC capital-market
integration. Nor, in fact, does he give us a clear-cut operational defini-
tion of capital-market integration itself. It is not always evident, more-
over, whether he is referring to the level or to the rate of integration,
a althoughhe is presumably concerned only with the latter. And he does
e not make sufficiently explicit the differing degrees of significance that
g the different categories of long-term capital movements may have for
the process of capital-market integration, a point that is stressed in
the OECD report on capital markets. While these shortcomings make
it somewhat difficult to evaluate his results, I believe there would be
general agreement with his main
Although aware of the limitations of the official data he uses on
long-term capital movements, Hawkins does not specifically indicate
g that the data comprise only net outflows of domestic capital and net
inflows of foreign capital. If the gross flows differ appreciably from the82 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
net flows in either direction, the data might not reflect the true degree
of significance of these movements as forces integrating national
capital markets.
In his various tests with the data on capital movements, Hawkins
seems to be more interested in whether the EEC countries have under- of
gone a higher rate of capital-market integration than developed coun-
tries in general, rather than in whether the rate of integration among ra
EEC capital markets themselves has significantly increased (his origi- ic
nally stated intention). This is evidenced by his extensive use of per-
centages of intra-EEC capital flows to total EEC capital inflows and ho
outflows, or categories thereof, as contrasted with an examination of
the absolute trend of intra-EEC capital movements alone. His conclu-
sion here that European capital markets are not becoming appreciably
more integrated seems, in fact, to be based largely on the fact that the
percentages show no pronounced or consistent trend. Yet the under- UN
lying data that he uses do clearly show that the absolutevolumeof
intra-EEC long-term capital movements increased during the period,
sharply in some categories. One must of course beware of equating
the rate of growth of intra-EEC capital movements with the rate of bo
growth of EEC capital-market integration. But, in any event, Hawkins re
provides us with no standard by which the two could be related.
Hawkins' preference for relative rather than absolute comparisons bad'
also shows up in his discussion of the integrative effects of the Euro-
bond market. He argues, though not on the basis of statistics, that the
Eurobond market has been more effective in integrating the capital FrJ
markets of the EEC countries with outside markets, mainly those of
the United States, than with each other. This is undoubtedly true, but (I)
clearly it would not be, and has not been, inconsistent with a greater of
absolute(even if indirect) degree of linkage among the EEC capital
markets.
Hawkins gets closer to the core of the matter when he examines
the pattern of interest rates in the EEC countries. Closer integration
of capital markets should show up most directly, not in any particular
pattern of long-term capital movements, but in a greater similarity in
levels and especially in movements of long-term interest rates in the
markets concerned. While Hawkins' evidence here proved mixed cap
among pairs of countries, so far as comparisons between the periods graiCOMMENT BY MIKESELL•83
e 1957—62 and 1963—67 were concerned, no pronounced uniform trends
j towardsgreater similarity in interest-rate patterns emerged. And in
1968—69, as he observes, there was a marked tendency for interest-rate
s movements to diverge. Hawkins' findings here generally confirm those
of other investigators.
Making a similar set of comparisons between short-term interest
g rates in the different markets, Hawkins finds that the covariation was
less than in the case of bond yields. This is a surprising result. If the
comparisons were made between covered short-term interest rates,
ci however, the result might have been more in keeping with expectations.
RAYMONDF. MIKESELL
UNIVERSITYOF OREGON
-1, A common concern of these two very enlightening papers is with
•g the benefits and costs of free or freer international capital movements,
both from the standpoint of an individual country and from that of
S regional integration. Anticipating the entrance of Britain into the Com-
mon Market, I propose to deal with the two papers on an integrated
S basis.
It seems convenient to set forth in an orderly way the relevant
e factors in judging the case for the export of direct-investment capital.
11 From the standpoint of the economic welfare of an individual country,
'f direct-capital export ought to be considered on the following bases:
1 (1) the role of foreign investment in facilitating trade; (2) a comparison
r of the social returns on capital investment abroad with that on domestic
d capital; and (3) its impact on the balance of payments. For an integrated
area, such as the EEC, it is necessary to consider allocative efficiency
S and other benefits shared by the members of regional groups. As in
the case of the benefits of free trade, the benefits from free factor move-
Lr mentsare not going to be distributed equally among the members of
the group.
e With respect to the EEC, Hawkins rightly regards the freeing of
d capital movements as constituting an important contribution to inte-
S gration, complementing the freeing of trade. The benefits from ther
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spreadof technical knowledge, improved allocative efficiency., scale to,.
economies, and the integration of markets associated with direct- St
investment flows are likely to be substantial even where the actual
volume of capital flows among the EEC members is not large. More- Ia:
over, the generally nondiscriminatory nature of the liberalization of dc
• direct investments by the EEC makes it possible. for multinational
I
firms.with headquarters in the United States to promote factor move- Er
ments associated with the flow of direct investment within the EEC. se
I suspect that some of these direct-investment flows within the EEC Eu
are concealed in the internal accounts of multinational firms with head-
quarters outside the Common Market.
• Hawkins suggests that financial integration within the EEC may th.
facilitate structural adjustments required for both balance-of-payments re
equilibrium and stable economic growth. Thus the movement of direct- d4
investmentcapital provides a vehicle for distributing technical progress inj
• and productivity growth more evenly throughout the Common Market.
It may be noted,, however, that there is some tendency for the more of
rapidly growing countries to attract more capital from abroad than they en
export. For example, there is considerable evidence that direct invest- ce
ments by the United States in manufacturing abroad have expanded so
more rapidly in those countries with the highest growth rates. It is tn
also worth noting that during the period 1960—68, Germany imported
more direct-investment capital from her EEC partners than she in-
vested in them, and Germany's growth rate was somewhat higher than
• the average for the EEC as a whole. A tendency for those countries
with the most dynamic growth to attract direct investment from the rel
rest of the economically integrated areas could have adverse conse- oni
quences for interregional balance. of
• The problem faced by Britain with regard to the free movement of aId
direct-investment capital is somewhat different, at least so long as m4
Britain remains outsidethe EEC. A certain amount of .direct foreign
investment is a concomitant of modern trade. A country cannot be a
• successful exporter of manufactures without investing in marketing
and assembling facilities abroad; in some cases it may be forced by
competition to produce certain components abroad. On the other to
hand, a country can be a successful exporter without massive amounts
of foreign investment. The ratio of Japanese direct foreign investment
• .••••
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toher exports of manufactures is a small fraction of that for the United
- Statesand is smaller than that for Britain as well. I strongly suspect
that direct investment by American corporations through acquiring
- largeEuropean firms that buy relatively little from the United States
f does not provide social returns equal to the opportunity costs of
investment in the United States. On the other hand, there are costs in
trying to set up a system of direct-investment controls that would
separate foreign investments that yield net social returns over oppor-
2 tunity costs to the investing country from those that do not.
Cohen is concerned with the net social gain or cost for the British
• economy of capital exports for direct investment abroad. Estimating
the balance-of-payments effects of direct foreign investment, however,
s requires more than a simple comparison between social returns from
• domestic and from foreign investment. This is mainly because the
s investing country may be employing a higher social rate of discount to
foreign exchange than to domestic income. In the face of a balance-
e of-payments crisis, the social rate of discount for calculating the pres-
y ent value of annual increments of foreign-exchange income may con-
ceivably be 100 per cent. However, this is rarely the case, given the
-d sources of external borrowing that are available today. But for coun-
tries with chronic balance-of-payments difficulties, the rate of discount
d applied to foreign-exchange income is usually substantially above that
applied to domestic income.
n Cohen examines the question of whether Britain should restrict
direct foreign investment, in terms of the trade-off between capital
e restrictions on the one hand and trade restrictions or unemployment
on the other. In so doing he compares the annual social costs to Britain
of improving the balance of payments by £ 100 million under three
• alternatives—capital restriction, trade restriction, and domestic de-
is mand reduction. Based on a study by Richard Cooper, Cohen estimates
• ;n that the annual cost to Britain of improving her balance of payments
a by £100 million is £3 million, if direct capital exports are restricted,
•ig and £45millionif Britain applies trade restrictions, the next best
• alternative. Now in making a comparison of this kind, it is important
to specify whether the £ 100 million of direct foreign investment is
• ts only postponed for a year (and added to next year's normal foreign
• at investment) or whether the £100 million is never restored. In the86 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
latter case, the comparison is between a once-for-all cost mil-
lion) of imposing trade restrictions to improve the balance of payments
by £100 million for one year, and the discounted value million
per year in perpetuity, the loss from not investing abroad £100 mil-
lion for one year. The choice would seen to depend upon the social
rate of discount, but if we employ the 3 per cent rate assumed by Cohen
(and Cooper) one would have to opt for trade restrictions and against
cutting back foreign investment.' I might add that if a more realistic
social rate of discount were used, say 10 per cent, restricting foreign
investment clearly would be preferable to trade restrictions.
Now I am quite willing to admit that if a country must choose be-
tween restricting trade and restricting capital exports, the latter is
preferable. But to be realistic, Britain is not faced with an absolute
foreign-exchange constraint over a given time period. Given the
availability of large amounts of international credit from the IMF and
the Group of Ten, it is unlikely that Britain would be faced with a
situation that forced her to restrict direct investment regardless of the
foreign-exchange earnings from an increment of such investment.
Therefore, Britain must consider whether the restriction on direct-
investment outflow may not be too costly a means of securing an im-
mediate saving of foreign exchange.
In his analysis Cohen employs the finding of the Reddaway Report
that British foreign investment produces an operating return of 6 per
cent a year, as compared with a domestic "opportunity" cost of capital
of approximately 3 per cent per year. Both of these figures seem very
low to me but I can only cite another authority in defense of my intui-
tive judgment. Professor J. H. Dunning, a long-time student of British
foreign investment, estimates the net return on British foreign invest-
ment in manufacturing to have been 12.5 per cent per year over the
1956—63 period and the recoupment period on marginal foreign invest-
ment is estimated to be six years. Dunning believes that the Reddaway
Report underestimates both the marginal return from the flow of
British private direct investment and the positive balance-of-payments
effects of such investment. He bases this conclusion partly on the
'In his reply to my comments Cohen stated that he meant a temporary postpone-
ment of foreign investment, allof be restored, buthe admitted that his
























- groundsthat the Reddaway Report takes insufficient account of the
effects of not investing on the efficiency and profitability of existing
investment and partly on a difference with the Reddaway Report's
- assumptionsregarding the effects of foreign investment on imports by
LI the host country.2 We need more empirical evidence before judging
between several possible models for determining the balance-of-pay-
ments effects of foreign investment—such as the results of the current
c study being undertaken at the National Bureau of Economic Research
by Robert Lipsey and Merle Weiss on the relationship of American
manufacturing abroad to exports from the United States. It is worth
noting, however, that the British are engaged in the same type of
controversy as is taking place in the United States regarding the
e balance-of-payments effects of direct foreign investment. Nevertheless,
e even if the rate of return on foreign investment estimated by the Red-
d daway Report can be shown to be too low, a domestic "opportunity"
a cost of capital of 3 per cent per year seems ridiculously low.3 Thus,
-.e this type of comparison may well favor domestic investment over
t. foreign investment, especially if a higher rate of discount is applied
to foreign-exchange income.
Turning to flows of portfolio capital and loans, Hawkins has an-
alyzed the benefits and costs of integrating financial markets within
rt the EEC. Among the costs, he regards the freedom of capital move-
ment as constraining the independent exercise of domestic monetary
policies. Nevertheless, I wonder whether a larger degree of financial
market integration, including the intra-EEC integration of capital
submarkets, might not provide a means of easing the balance-of-pay-
ments problems associated with economic integration. Tibor Scitovsky
and others have argued that the high degree of integration of asset
markets, plus the ability of deficit areas to create new assets, provides
a mechanism of balance-of-payments adjustment between regions
within a country, which is gradual and relatively painless.4 How much
of integration of financial-asset markets would be required to relieve the
••ts liquidity constraint within the EEC? Would a high degree of integration
SeeJ. H. Dunning. "Foreign Investment Controversy: Il—The Effects of Foreign
Investment on Resources.' The Bankers June, 1969. pp. 354—360.
ne- See for example. W. J. Baumol, "On the Social Rate of Discount," AmericanEco-
his nomjcRet'ien',September. 1968, pp. 788—802.
Tibor Scitovsky, Moneyand the Balance ofPayments,Chicago,1969.
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r
88•INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
of asset markets require a common currency? I think these are impor-
tant questions for the future development of the EEC. r
In considering the degree to which intra-EEC financial integration
has taken place during the 1960's, Hawkins finds little evidence of a
strong growth of intra-EEC private long-term capital flows, either
in data on the flows themselves or in any tendency toward harmoniza-
tion of interest-rate movements among the domestic capital markets c
of the EEC countries. It seems evident that the segmented domestic
capital markets of the individual countries have continued to be in-
sulated to a substantial degree. Hawkins does point out that the
major integrating vehicles are the Eurodollar and the Eurobond mar-
kets. However, he minimizes the effects of these markets by pointing
to their failure to integrate the various segments of the several national
capital markets. He also presents evidence that EEC companies have p
not been large borrowers from the Eurobond market. a
I have the feeling that there has been more financial integration
within the Common Market than meets Hawkins' eye. For one thing,
the data on intra-EEC capital movements probably do not reflect a p
substantial proportion of the actual intra-EEC capital flows that take
place through the intermediation of both the Eurobond and the Euro-
dollar markets, since many of these movements would show up in the
data on EEC capital transactions with outside areas. Large interna-
tional firms and large financial institutions borrow and lend in these
internationalmarkets and their effects on the various segments of
the domestic capital markets in the EEC countries are indirect and
difficult to determine. Moreover, the domestic markets are influenced
directly by national monetary policies. In addition the interest-rate
differentials between the domestic markets and the international
markets in assets denominated in dollars and other international cur-
rencies are affected by the swap rates, which in turn are frequently
manipulated by the monetary authorities. Hawkins' findings regarding
the harmonization of interest-rate movements between domestic mar-
kets are, therefore, not surprising. Nevertheless, a substantial volume
of intra-EEC capital flows is taking place through the intermediation
of the international markets.
Turning again to Cohen's paper and the larger issue of freeing
capital movements in Britain, I am disturbed by the implication thatT
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Britainshould go on indefinitely controlling capital exports of her
residents. is this because of Britain's precarious net reserve position
and the overhang of sterling balances? If so, would not a change in
the role of sterling as a reserve currency along the lines suggested by
• Cohen in his recent Princeton essay5 eliminate the need for controls?
• Or is the necessity of capital controls based on the view that Britain
cannot afford to be a substantial net exporter of real capital? Britain's
per capita G NP is still one of the highest in the world so that the ques-
tion of whether she can afford to be a net capital exporter is scarcely
the issue. It is a matter for national decision as to whether she is willing
• to be a net capital exporter, and by how much. Finally, is the argument
that if Britain permits free capital movements, net capital exports will
inevitably be larger than Britain desires or larger than her balance of
payments will support? Given a general freeing of capital movements
among developed countries and perhaps within a broadened EEC,
might not Britain expect to enhance her role as a financial intermediary
- , withouta large net outflow of capital? Assuming such a regime, what
policies would be required to keep Britain's net capital exports within
the limits set by national policy without the adoption of the alternatives
of domestic demand reductions or trade restriction? These appear to
me to be the relevant questions.
- Benjamin J. Cohen, The Reform of Sterling, Essays in International Finance, No.
77, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, December. 1969.
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